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For many years copyright was a backwater of the law. Per-
ceived as an esoteric and narrow field beset by hypertechnical for-
malities, the discipline and its practitioners were largely isolated 
from scholarly and case law developments in other areas. There 
were exceptions, of course. Well before the explosion of intellectual 
property litigation in the last twenty years, persons such as 
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and Judge Learned Hand brought a wealth 
of learning and broad perspective to copyright. But by and large 
copyright looked only to itself for guidance. 
Today, copyright scholars are increasingly reaching across dis-
ciplinary boundaries for sources of insight and analogy. Economics 
and philosophy as well as doctrines from other areas of the law 
have been employed. But courts have often rebuffed attempts to 
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use the learning of other fields, 1 and balkanization persists in much 
of the commentary as well. 
One major reason for the increasing breadth of copyright 
scholarship is the 1976 Copyright Act, which simplified and ratio-
nalized the complexities and formalisms of prior law, making in-
depth analysis of broad issues easier and more attractive. But the 
trend began earlier. In my view at least three pre-1976 works mark 
the transition to a broader sort of copyright scholarship. One was 
Benjamin Kaplan's An Unhurried View of Copyright,2 an explora-
tion simultaneously leisurely and incisive of copyright's history, 
context, and policies. Another was Stephen Breyer's important in-
vestigation of copyright's economic justifications.3 A third was 
Melville Nimmer's treatise, which better than any reference work 
before it provided a thorough and analytic guide to the area.4 
That the discipline has reached a new maturity is confirmed 
by Paul Goldstein's treatise. 5 This new work by an acknowledged 
leader in the field provides a coherent and comprehensive view of 
copyright and related sources of protection of intellectual property 
that is animated and unified by an explicit normative structure. 
The Goldstein treatise knits copyright's various doctrines into a 
whole that can be evaluated and placed in larger context. 
This essay will begin with a description of the Goldstein trea-
tise and of recent developments in the law that it surveys. The 
essay will then examine the treatise's treatment of a variety of top-
1 For example, Chief Judge Oakes of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a concur-
ring opinion urged the use of the First Amendment, precedent from nuisance law, and eco-
nomic analysis to secure for the publisher of a critical biography the liberty to print quota-
tions from the subject's letters and diaries. Oakes's colleagues agreed that the biography 
should not be enjoined, but only on the nonsubstantive ground of laches. The Second Cir-
cuit's majority opinion exhibits a lack of receptivity to the kind of broad scholarship and 
concern for writers' freedom that animated the opinion of Judge Oakes. Also see the valua-
ble opinion of Judge Leval in the lower court. New Era Publications, Int'l, ApS v Henry 
Holt & Co., 695 F Supp 1493 (S D NY 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 873 F2d 576, 585 (2d 
Cir 1989), petition for reh'g den'd 884 F2d 659 (2d Cir 1989), cert den'd, 110 S Ct 1168 
(1990). See also Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The Nineteenth Donald C. Brace Memo-
rial Lecture, 36 J Copyright Society USA 167 (1989). And see Pierre N. Leval, Toward a 
Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev 1105 (1990); and Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A 
Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv L Rev 1137 (1990). 
• Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (Columbia, 1967). 
• Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv L Rev 281 (1970). 
• Melville B. Nimmer and David Ninlmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the 
Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic Property, and the Protection of Ideas (Matthew 
Bender, 1989) (4 vols) ("Nimmer on Copyright"). 
• Paul Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice (Little, Brown, 1989). All 
parenthetical volume and page references in text and notes are to this treatise. 
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ics, most of which potentially illuminate one of our culture's cen-
tral concerns: the extent to which new authors, artists, and audi-
ences should be able to use prior works to express themselves. 
Among the topics treated here are issues of derivative works; fed-
eral preemption of state law restraints on the use of ideas; copy-
right's idea/expression dichotomy; and the subconscious copying 
rule. Part II of the essay then uses some of the discipline's new 
tools to address an aspect of a central and controversial question: 
whether courts should restrain the use of copyright as a tool of 
private censorship. 
In carrying out this latter task in Part II, the essay draws 
upon the treatise's normative apparatus as well as other sources. 
As a substantive matter, this portion of the essay tentatively con-
cludes that it is consistent with both the norms of copyright and 
other patterns in the law to deny enforcement to copyright owners 
who, having injected their work into public discourse, seek to use 
the copyright statute to protect themselves or that work from criti-
cism, hostile interpretation, and scrutiny. But the most important 
point here may be not substantive but methodological, an indica-
tion of the kind of far-ranging interdisciplinary inquiry that is nec-
essary if the hardest questions in copyright are to be answered. 
I. THE TREATISE: ITS MILIEU, STYLE AND SUBSTANCE 
A. Entering the Information Age: A Quarter-Century of Copyright 
Melville Nimmer published the first edition of his now-famous 
treatise on copyright in 1963. By then it had long been acknowl-
edged that existing copyright law, a patchwork of emendations 
grafted onto the 1909 Copyright Act, was cumbersome and out-
dated. But achieving a comprehensive revision proved difficult. Re-
peated efforts were made, and the revision process heated up again 
in the early 1960s, with a "mockup revision bill" introduced in 
Congress in 1964. 6 Copyright experts welcomed Nimmer's treatise 
for, among other things, the support it implicitly provided for a 
thorough revision of the legislation. 7 
In the ensuing quarter century there have been many changes 
in the relevant law. Congress thoroughly revised the Copyright Act 
• See HR 11947, 88th Cong, 2d Sess (July 20, 1964), in 110 Cong Rec 16256 (July 20, 
1964); and S 3008, 88th Cong, 2d Sess (July 20, 1964), in 110 Cong Rec 16260-61 (July 20, 
1964). Senator McClellan and Representative Cellar "introduced [the bill] pro forma by 
request of the Copyright Office." Benjamin Kaplan, Nimmer on Copyright, 78 Harv L Rev 
1094, 1094 (1965). 
7 See Kaplan, 78 Harv L Rev at 1095. 
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in 1976.8 Among the more significant alterations has been a length-
ening of the term during which a copyright can subsist before the 
work enters the public domain,9 and the replacement of state pro-
tection for unpublished writings with federal copyright.10 The re-
vised Act also eased the statutory formalities that had long bedev-
iled copyright proprietors, notably the requirements of renewal 
and the necessity of properly affixing a copyright notice to all pub-
lished copies. Works created after January 1, 1978, the effective 
date of the new Act, were freed from renewal requirements alto-
gether, 11 and certain errors in notice were prospectively deemed 
harmless or curable.12 More recently, in order that the United 
States could join the many nations that subscribe to the Berne 
Convention, Congress rendered most of the remaining formalities 
nonmandatory for new works and the new publication of existing 
works.13 
Even more important developments in copyright have taken 
place in the past few decades outside the legislative arena. The 
United States has witnessed a steady decline in heavy manufactur-
ing, while the industries most affected by intellectual property 
law-such as entertainment and computer software-have :flour-
ished. In the same period, tape recorder, photocopier, VCR, and 
computer ownership has dramatically increased, 14 enabling private 
individuals to cheaply and easily reproduce others' copyrighted 
8 An Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 
(1976), codified at 17 use§§ 101 et seq (1988). All section number references in subsequent 
footnotes are to this Act. 
9 §§ 302-04. 
10 See notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
11 Congress counterbalanced the resulting decrease in complexities by enacting a "ter-
mination right" more complex than renewal had ever been. §§ 203, 304(c). Unlike renewal, 
however, failure to exercise the termination right does not invalidate the copyright. Id. 
1
• §§ 405-06. Works published prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act that entered 
the public domain for failure to comply with then reqwsite formalities are not saved by the 
new provisions. Today one cannot be sure of the copyright status of a work created or dis-
tributed in prior years without researching the details of its publication, renewal, notice 
affixations, and transfers, and analyzing the impact of those events under the then-relevant 
law. See text at notes 29-30 (discussing the Goldstein treatise's coverage of still-applicable 
provisions of former law). 
13 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-568, 102 Stat 2853 
(1988); see also Jane C. Ginsburg and John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years 
Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 1, 9-17 (1988). 
Some formalities remain applicable to new works and new publication of existing works, 
but failure to comply with these formalities does not divest a proprietor of his or her copy-
right. See, for example, §§ 401(d) and 402(d). But see §406(c) (lack of copyright notice on 
copies publicly distributed prior to the Act's effective date can still divest copyright). 
" See, for example, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights In an Age of Electronics and Information 9-11 (GPO, 1986). 
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works.111 These changes have made copyright law, not long ago con-
sidered to be among the "most esoteric of subjects,"16 an area of 
mainstream study and everyday discussion. 
The usual barometers of legal activity have, predictably, re-
sponded in kind to the statutory and practical changes affecting 
copyright in the last few decades: litigation on copyright and other 
interests in intellectual property has steadily increased, 17 and 
copyright scholarship has also grown. The Nimmer treatise itself, 
already two volumes before the 1976 Act, was expanded to four 
volumes to embrace the new legislation. 
When it appeared, the Nimmer treatise was received as "un-
doubtedly the most thoughtful and thought-provoking treatment 
of American copyright law.ms In recent years several excellent one-
volume texts on copyright have come on the market,19 but a short 
treatise cannot achieve the comprehensiveness of Professor Nim-
mer's four-volume effort. Professor Paul Goldstein's new three-vol-
ume treatise, by contrast, represents a substantial challenge to 
Nimmer's preeminence. With its publication, Professor Goldstein, 
already a leading presence in the copyright field,20 has made an-
other major contribution. 21 
1
• I am indebted to participants in the University of Chicago Law and Economics work-
shop for bringing home to me, in the context of a discussion unrelated to this essay, the 
importance of this point. 
11 Henry G. Henn, Nimmer on Copyright, 16 Stan L Rev 1146, 1146 (1964). 
17 See, for example, Paul Goldstein, Publicity: The New Property, 8 Stanford Lawyer 
9-10 (Winter 1982-83). 
1
• Henn, 16 Stan L Rev at 1148 (cited in note 16). 
1
• One of my personal favorites among the one-volume treatises is Marshall A. Leaffer, 
Understanding Copyright Law (Matthew Bender, 1st ed 1989). Other useful treatments in-
clude William F. Patry, Latman's The Copyright Law (BNA, 6th ed 1986) (the respected 
descendant of Herbert A. Howell, The Copyright Law (BNA, 3d ed 1952)); and Neil Boor-
styn, Copyright Law (Law Co-op, 1981 & Supp 1988). A copyright treatise by Professor 
Howard Abrams is scheduled to appear shortly, to be published by Clark Boardman. 
•• Professor Goldstein is the Stella W. & Ira S. Lillick Professor at Stanford Law 
School. In addition to his many articles, Professor Goldstein's achievements include his 
copyright casebook, Copyright, Patent, Trademark, and Related State Doctrines: Cases 
and Materials on Intellectual Property (Foundation, 3d ed 1990); and his writings in the 
related area of tangible property law, see Real Estate Transactions: Cases and Materials on 
Land Transfer, Development and Finance (Foundation, 2d ed 1988); and Real Property 
(Foundation, 1984). Professor Goldstein was also the Chairman of the Advisory Panel to the 
1986 OTA Report, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information 
(cited in note 14), and is of counsel to the firm of Morrison & Foerster in San Francisco. 
21 It will not be my task here to compare the Ninlmer and Goldstein treatises. Even 
were I interested in such comparisons, it is still probably too early to assess the impact of 
Professor Ninlmer's 1985 death on the future course of his treatise, now being edited by his 
son David. See Michael J. Lynch, Updating the Law of Copyright, 12 The Criv Sheet 13, an 
insert in 21 Am Assn of L Libr Newsl (March 1990). 
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B. The Treatise: A Structural Overview 
The textual material of the Goldstein treatise is divided into 
eight parts. The first is an unusually helpful introduction that ori-
ents the reader to the underlying principles of copyright (Vol I at 
3-22), summarizes the applicable law (Vol I at 23-44), and gives an 
overview of the practical aspects of copyright practice, providing 
along the way some useful suggestions for both litigation and plan-
ning. (Vol I at 44-54) The substance of the other textual parts is 
clear enough from their titles: "Subject Matter, Formalities, Own-
ership, and Term" (Vol I at 55-509); "Rights" (Vol I at 511-724); 
"Infringement" (Vol II at 1-143); "Defenses" (Vol II at 145-243); 
"Remedies" (Vol II at 245-377); "Procedure" (Vol II at 379-466); 
and "Other Sources of Protection: State, Federal and International 
Law." (Vol II at 467-706) 
This textual material, which comprises the first two volumes 
of the treatise, is well-organized and clearly written. It is usefully 
cross-referenced to related topics within the treatise, and is sup-
ported in the footnotes by ample references to leading cases and 
commentary. Given the range of topics covered, however, the deci-
sion to limit the text to two volumes makes Professor Goldstein's 
treatment of particular topics somewhat more abridged than one 
would like. I hope that he adds another volume of text in the next 
edition, giving a more leisurely treatment of precedent and history 
and citing more secondary sources-including his own articles, ref-
erences to which appear only sparsely. 
The treatise's third volume contains the index and tables, but 
also functions as a mini-library. Except for case reports, this vol-
ume provides most of the primary materials that a conscientious 
practitioner of copyright will need: the 1909 and 1976 Copyright 
Acts and other relevant statutes; legislative history; Copyright Of-
fice regulations; as well as international copyright conventions. It 
also provides forms useful in copyright practice. In addition, Pro-
fessor Goldstein has integrated the amendments of the Berne Im-
plementation Act of 1988 into the text of the 1976 Act (Vol III at 
4-97), and helpfully provides the pagination of the original legisla-
tive reports in brackets. 
The materials for Volume III have been carefully selected. No 
single volume-even one with nearly a thousand pages, as this one 
has-could contain all of the potentially relevant legislative his-
tory. For example, the revision that culminated in the 1976 Act 
began many decades earlier, and current works can still be affected 
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by the 1909 Act and a number of minor pieces of legislation.22 Vol-
ume III does contain the most important documents relating to the 
1976 act, namely the House and Conference Reports, and a signifi-
cant portion of the legislative history of the Sound Recording 
Amendment of 1971 and the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 
of 1984. For deeper coverage of the applicable legislative history, 
one would inevitably need to go beyond one's own bookshelf.23 
For the sake of newcomers to the field, the treatise could per-
haps have included a listing of other applicable sources, such as 
the Final Report of the Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyright Works (CONTU),24 and useful research tools such as the 
Kaminstein Legislative History Project.25 Other sources on the 
border between primary and secondary materials that might have 
been mentioned include the many Studies on Copyright,26 each 
written by a prominent copyright expert under a commission from 
Congress; and the recent report from the Office of Technology As-
sessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics 
and Information.27 Professor Goldstein refers to a wide range of 
sources in his footnotes, of course, but a central list of such materi-
als, along with a bibliography of ordinary secondary sources (books 
and articles on copyright and related matters) would have made a 
useful addendum.28 
22 See notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
•• See, for example, the six volumes of E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds, 
Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act (Rothman & Co., 1976), or the seventeen 
volumes in George S. Grossman, ed, Omnibus Copyright Revision Legislative History (Wm. 
S. Hein & Co., 1976). A unique resource providing extensive legislative materials on the 1976 
Act is Alan Latman and James F. Lightstone, eds, The Kaminstein Legislative History Pro-
ject: A Compendium and Analytical Index of Materials Leading to the Copyright Act of 
1976 (Rothman & Co., 1981) (6 vols). Despite the complexity of its indexing system, the 
Kaminstein volumes offer invaluable access to decades of congressional hearings, reports, 
and other material. 
24 United States, National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted 
Works, Final Report (Library of Congress, 1979) ("CONTU Report"). 
•• Latman and Lightstone, Kaminstein Legislative History Project (cited in note 23). 
•• See Copyright Society of the USA, ed, Studies on Copyright (Rothman & Co., Ar-
thur Fisher Memorial ed 1963) (two volume compilation). 
11 Cited in note 14. As noted in note 20, Professor Goldstein chaired the project's Advi-
sory Panel. 
28 An excellent if brief bibliography of important secondary materials is available in 
Alan Latman, Robert A. Gorman, and Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties: Cases 
and Materials at 811-22 (Michie, 3d ed 1989). See also J. Paul Lomio and Susan Kuklin, 
Selected Bibliography of Copyright Materials With Annotation, 4 Legal Ref Serv Q 39 
(Spring 1984); CONTU Report at 135-141 (cited in note 24); and Henriette Mertz, Copy-
right Bibliography (US Copyright Office, 1950). 
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C. On Navigating a Difficult Course: Selected Issues of Style and 
Substance 
At least three challenges confront the scholar who pens a trea-
tise in this field: the many statutory layers that can attach to a 
given work of authorship; copyright's controversial normative un-
derpinnings; and the need to provide evaluations of existing law, 
and suggestions for the future, without distorting the map of pres-
ent and past. The following sections discuss the way the treatise 
meets these three challenges. 
* * * * 
The 1initial challenge facing the writer on copyright is docu-
menting the many changes that the law has undergone in recent 
decades. Since failure to comply with a formality required some 
years in the past may have placed a work permanently in the pub-
lic domain, and since authors' deaths and other events can affect 
_the current validity of copyright assignments in ways determined 
by "prior" law, even now-repealed statutes remain applicable to 
current controversies. For example, copyrights of newly created 
works need not be renewed. (Vol I at 436-37) Yet the most recent 
Supreme Court case on copyright concerned a renewal question. At 
issue was Alfred Hitchcock's classic suspense film Rear Window, a 
derivative work based on a short story under an assignment of 
copyright that was no longer valid because the assignor had died 
prior to renewal.29 The Court held that the movie could not be law-
fully reissued without the consent of the new holders of copyright 
in the story, the decision turning largely on requirements super-
seded for all works entering federal copyright in 1978 or later.30 
The relevant statutory schemes thus create a palimpsest of 
chronological layers to which a copyright text must provide a use-
ful map. -This Professor Goldstein does quite well, providing a 
technical outline and alerting the reader to the fact patterns that 
•• The 1976 Act makes clear in § 304 that works already subject to renewal at the time 
the new Act became effective would remain subject to renewal requirements. If the author 
dies before renewing, the right to renew passes to statutorily-designated beneficiaries who 
will, if they renew, own the copyright for the duration of their renewed term. § 304(a). 
Renewal rights are alienable, so that an author could enforceably promise in advance both 
to renew and to convey the renewed copyright to an assignee. However, the author's agree-
ment would not bind the new owners of the renewal copyright if the author died prior to 
renewal. See Stewart v Abend, 1990 US LEXIS 2184. 
80 Id at *25-26. 
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implicate prior law. For this and a multitude of other reasons, the 
treatise will serve as an excellent guide to the perplexed. 
A second challenge facing the writer on copyright arises from 
the ambiguities of copyright's normative and empirical underpin-
nings. As ·will be discussed below at more length, various theories 
may play a role in copyright. Professor Goldstein himself identifies 
at least four: "natural justice," "the economic argument," "devel-
opment of the national culture," and an argument that copyright 
"makes for social cohesion. "31 To ignore the normative possibilities 
in treating any particular provision of the copyright laws would be 
unfortunate, yet it would be an immense burden to analyze fully 
the competing goals, to examine what their precise relationships 
should be, and to gather data and assess the available empirical 
evidence to determine how well the statute fulfilled these goals. 
Professor Goldstein has chosen a felicitous middle ground, focusing 
on the two major strains of argument. He indicates both that the 
dominant purpose of copyright is instrumental-to "serve the gen-
eral public interest in an abounding national culture"-and that 
theories of natural rights have some place, albeit subordinate and 
ill-defined, in the copyright scheme. (Vol II at 5; Volume I at 8-9; 
Volume II at 685-86) He then employs the instrumental model to 
analyze the nature of the choices Congress made when it enacted 
the various provisions of the Copyright Act. (See, for example, Vol 
I at 4-5; Vol I at 516-17; Vol II at 197.) Use of this model brings 
unity to the treatise's treatments of disparate topics, and, by pin-
pointing hypotheses on which Congress's decisions may rest, clari-
fies for researchers empirical and normative issues needing atten-
tion. Professor Goldstein also analogizes to other areas of the law 
and their use of various norms, drawing for example, on the cost-
benefit calculus apparent in certain nuisance law doctrine. (Vol II 
at 197 n 23) 
The third challenge is posed by the desirability of providing 
the reader more than description. When a leading authority pens a 
treatise, we have the opportunity to learn not only what that per-
son thinks the state of the law is, but also what he thinks it should 
be. The concomitant danger is that the author might confuse pre-
scription with description, might make errors of ascription (inad-
vertently attributing his own views to the courts or to Congress), or 
might mar an otherwise sound discussion by advocating only one 
side of the issue. 
11 Vol II at 685-86, quoting Stephen Stewart, International Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights 3 (Butterworth's of New Zealand, 1983). 
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Professor Goldstein willingly shares with the reader his opin-
ions on how the law should be, but there is no air of polemic here. 
His normative views are labeled as such and ordinarily the reader 
can easily separate them from the treatise's description of what 
Congress or the courts have in fact done. Goldstein presents his 
positions without undue diffidence, yet with a dispassion that re-
flects respect for the reader. 
The next two subsect1ons illustrate the treatise's meeting of 
this third challenge by exploring Professor Goldstein's treatments 
of two topics on which he has clear views: derivative works and 
preemption. Following this, the essay returns to consider further 
the treatise's use of an instrumental model to meet the challenge 
posed by copyright's normative difficulties. 
1. Derivative works. 
The newcomer to copyright typically expects that any work 
original or creative enough to be copyrighted could not also in-
fringe another copyright. And indeed, judges interpreting the origi-
nal copyright statutes largely took the position that any substan-
tial creative effort, even when it was applied to someone else's 
copyrighted work, could not infringe a copyright. For example, a 
translation could be both copyrightable and free of any control by 
the person who owned the copyright in the work being translated.32 
Over time, however, this changed. The rule that creative adapta-
tions could be copyrighted was retained33 (with one exception, 
mentioned below), but the law now gives the underlying work's 
copyright owner the exclusive right to authorize or make derivative 
works,34 subject to the public's generally applicable privileges35 and 
some minor additional limitations.36 The statute also provides that 
"protection for a work employing preexisting material in which 
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which 
•• See Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright at 9-12, 17-32 (cited in note 2) (En-
glish and American law). 
•• The 1976 Act explicitly provides that derivative works are entitled to a copyright. 
§§ 102, 103. The copyright "extends only to the material contributed by the author of [the 
derivative] work," and not, of course, to the "preexisting material." § 103. 
u § 106(2). Rights over specified derivative works had been gradually increased over 
the years, culminating in this general grant. See Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 
at 9-12, 17-32 (cited in note 2). 
35 For example, the public always has the privilege to make fair use of a copyrighted 
work, § 107, and the right to use a copyrighted work's ideas and other unprotectable ele-
ments. § 102(b). 
•• See, for example, §§ 203(b), 304(c)(6)(A) (certain uses of derivative works can con-
tinue after terminating the underlying grant). 
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such material has been used unlawfully."37 This means that a de-
rivative work is ineligible for copyright if it pervasively uses copy-
rightable elements of another's copyrighted work without 
permissibn. 38 
One of the best-informed persons to analyze and comment on 
the history and policy tensions inherent in rights to derivative 
work is Professor Goldstein himself, and in a 1983 article he per-
suasively argued that pervasive infringements should not forfeit 
copyright in a derivative work whose value lies primarily in new 
efforts and non-infringing use of other sources.39 As Goldstein has 
argued, even if the infringed work has a pervasive underlying pres-
ence in the new work, denying the second creator a copyright in 
what she has added removes incentives for creation while giving 
the first creator more protection than he needs40 or deserves.41 
Copyright law's harsh treatment of the derivative creator is 
not inevitable. Patent law makes the opposite and arguably prefer-
able choice, entitling the inventor of an improvement who has pro-
ceeded without permission from the owner of the original patent to 
an "improvement" patent. Although the owner of the improvement 
patent cannot sell the improved invention without the agreement 
of the owner of the underlying invention, the owner of the original 
invention cannot use the improvement without the improver's con-
sent.42 This seems likely to yield a more equitable division of reve-
nue than under copyright law, where a person who proceeds with-
out permission forfeits all copyright in her creation;43 also under 
07 § 103(a). 
38 So, for example, an anthology containing one infringing poem might be copyrightable 
as to the arrangement and selection of the other poems, but a translation of a copyrighted 
book would necessarily be so suffused with protectable elements unlawfully borrowed from 
the copied work (such as the original author's paragraph structure) that it could not sustain 
a copyright. Copyright Law Revision, HR Rep No 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 57-58 (1976) 
(reprinted in Vol ID at 114-15). 
•• Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J Copyright Society USA 
209, 244 (1983). 
•• Id. 
41 Id (by implication). Also see Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property and the Resti-
tutionary Impulse (draft manuscript on file with the University of Chicago Law Review) 
(examining the nature and limits of claims to "deserve reward"). 
Professor Goldstein's normative assessment of a first author's entitlements may have 
shifted somewhat. Compare Goldstein, 30 J Copyright Society USA 237-38, 244 (cited in 
note 39) with Vol I at 7-8, Vol II at 247-49, 277-80 (role of injunctions). 
" Peter D. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals§ 1.03 at 1-10 n 35, § 16.02 at 16-14, 
16-16 (Clark Boardman, 2d ed 1980). 
'" One might seek to justify the copyright rule by the first author's putative "moral 
right" to control the presentation of his work. Despite occasional flirtations, American law 
by and large has not adopted this European notion of droit moral; and it should not do so, 
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patent law, the interests of the "improver" are protected vis a vis 
third parties.44 So much might be said against Congress's handling 
of this issue in the copyright law. 
And yet, despite his belief that Congress should not have de-
nied copyright to works that pervasively employ without permis-
sion the copyrighted aspects of a preexisting work, Professor Gold-
stein's treatment of § 103(a), the relevant statutory provision, not 
only makes the existing rule clear, but begins with a statement of 
the congressional rationale. (Vol I at 216-17; Vol II at 142-43)45 
Only then does Goldstein go on to state his own position, con-
signing much to a short footnote (Vol I at 217 n 9) that focuses 
only on the problem of allowing a third party who has copied the 
derivative work to use that work's oWn. infringement as a defense. 
In fact, one wishes that Professor Goldstein had been willing to 
spin out his critical analysis a bit more and incorporate his more 
recent thoughts, or at least to cite his more developed treatment of 
the issue elsewhere.46 
2. Preemption of state law. 
Professor Goldstein is not always so retiring in presenting his 
views, particularly with regard to preemption (Vol II at 470-646), 
an area of longstanding interest to him.47 The preemption question 
at least not without substantial limitations. The notion, as interpreted abroad, seems to 
ignore the moral rights of audiences, see, for example, text at notes 86-94, 133, and may pay 
insufficient respect to values Americans associate with the First Amendment. 
•• The line between permitted "inspiration" (the borrowing of unprotected ideas and 
themes) and unlawful appropriation of copyrighted expression is a vague and wavering one; 
see discussion in note 69. Under current copyright law, if a poem inspires a play that subse-
quently is judged to make an infringing and pervasive use of the poem, a motion picture 
company that in turn copies the play in detail would need only the poet's permission to 
make a movie of it. The playwright's .contribution would be ignored. See Vol I at 217 n 9 
(desireability of preserving derivative work's copyright as against a third party). 
•• The rule denying copyright to the infringing portions of derivative works is usefully 
reiterated, as are other general principles, in factual contexts where they are likely to be 
implicated. See, for example, Goldstein's discussion of phonograph records (Vol I at 172) 
and computer databases (Vol I at 219 n 19). Beginners in copyright might, however, appreci-
ate a mention of this derivative work rule in the introductory overview. At an early point in 
the treatise, Professor Goldstein discusses the availability of copyright for a deliberate but 
creative rewording of Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn," but neglects to mention that such a 
copyright would be available only because Keats's poem is in the public domain. Vol I at 63. 
•• See note 39. 
47 See, for example, Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers 
and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L Rev 1107 (1977); 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.: Notes on a Closing Circle, 1974 Sup Ct Rev 81; "Inconsis-
tent Premises" and the "Acceptable Middle Ground:" A Comment on Goldstein v. Califor-
nia, 21 Bull Copyright Society USA 25 (1973); The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to 
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is an important one, for it largely governs the extent to which state 
law protection for intangibles is permissible. A host of state rights 
are potentially available to protect intellectual products either di-
rectly or indirectly; these include rights arising under the doctrines 
of unfair competition, misappropriation, trade secrets, privacy, 
contract, and quasi-contract, as well as the right of publicity. De-
termining which of such nonfederal rights survive the supremacy 
of federal law can be a complex and uncertain undertaking, partic-
ularly since the 1976 Copyright Act set forth a new section on pre-
emption, § 301. 
Section 301 of the 1976 Act defeats the assertion of a state law 
right48 if three tests are met: (1) the work sought to be protected is 
written down, filmed, tape recorded, or otherwise "fixed" under au-
thority of its proprietor; (2) it is otherwise within the subject mat-
ter of copyright; and (3) the state right is "equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright."49 (See Vol 
II at 473) The full contours of § 301, and of intellectual property 
preemption generally, have not been definitively adjudicated.150 
Lear, 59 Cal L Rev 873 (1971); Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 
Colum L Rev 49 (1969). 
" There may be other sources of invalidity as well. See notes 53, 61-62 . 
•• § 301(b). 
•• Congress enacted § 301 of the 1976 Act with two goals in mind. First, it sought to 
displace state "common law copyright" in unpublished writings with federal copyright pro-
tection, substituting a manageable unitary system for the difficult two-tier system (which 
primarily gave federal protection to published works and state protection to unpublished 
works). HR Rep No 94-176 at 129-30 (cited in note 37). Second,§ 301 sought to draw a clear 
line between federal and state protection. Id at 130. The first goal was accomplished; the 
second remains distant. 
One reason the line between federal and state protection remains blurred is a last-min-
ute amendment to § 301 that was accompanied by a thoroughly confused discussion on the 
floor of the Congress, which Professor Goldstein does a lovely job of explicating. Vol II at 
484-85. Another reason is the shifting views of the Supreme Court. The Court's preemption 
position reached a high-water mark with the Sears and Compco decisions in 1964, which 
Professor Goldstein says indicated "that the Court also intended to preempt state protec-
tion of subject matter that falls outside the scope of protectable subject matter." Vol II at 
496. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Stiffel Co., 376 US 225 (1964); and Compco Corp v Day-
Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 US 234 (1964). Since then, the Court's decisions have been so 
much more tolerant of state laws that Goldstein, among others, has speculated that Sears/ 
Compco may be considered overruled. Vol II at 497. Only recently, however, the Court reaf-
firmed the core holding of those two early cases, making clear that the patent law's refusals 
of protection create "federal right[s] to 'copy and to use' " that are, like any federal law, 
supreme over state law. Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US 141, 109 S 
Ct 971, 985 (1989) (state statute prohibiting the direct molding of unpatented boat hulls 
held preempted). 
It is too early to tell if the Bonito Boats approach applies to copyright law as well. 
Much of the opinion is written as if applicable solely to patent law, yet the Court's statutory 
analysis was informed by reference to the constitutional clause (Art 8, § 8, cl 8) that applies 
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The treatise's discussion of preemption contains a fairly high 
proportion of normative commentary and controversial interpreta-
tion. To some extent this is unavoidable; given the large number of 
currently unanswered questions in the preemption area, interpre-
tations of many of the cases and of portions of the statute itself 
will inevitably be controversial. Further, the shift in emphasis is 
not distracting to the reader. On the contrary, Professor Gold-
stein's handling of this difficult topic is remarkably clear. The trea-
tise not only gives an overview of preemption in the abstract (Vol 
II at 470-503); it also offers the reader a substantive and fairly ex-
tensive description of the various state law rights that border copy-
right (a compilation quite valuable in itself), and follows each 
treatment of state law with an exploration of how preemption 
would or could apply to the right under discussion. (Vol II at 503-
646) The tone remains dispassionate, and the treatise maintains a 
fairly clear line between description and prescription. Neverthe-
less, a newcomer to copyright, particularly one intent on finding 
answers to a narrow inquiry quickly, might well mistake some of 
the treatise's interpretations as stating the "black letter law" in an 
area where little is black letter certain. 
Most notably, the neophyte might be confused by the strength 
with which Professor Goldst.ein concludes that § 301 does not pre-
empt state grants of monopoly in ideas. 51 The Copyright Act of 
to both copyright and patent. 109 S Ct at 975-79, 983. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry 
Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement 
Theory, 41 Stan L Rev 1343, 1449 n 461 (1989) (exploring differences between copyright and 
patent in the context of the constitutional Copyright and Patent Clause). Further, the 
Court's mode of reasoning (finding an enforceable "federal right to 'copy and to use' " 
within the interstices of federal intellectual property law, 109 S Ct at 985) is potentially 
transferable to copyright. See Gordon, 41 Stan L Rev at 1399 n 251, 1403 n 266. Other 
patent preemption cases have been quite important to copyright doctrine, Vol II at 495-97, 
and Bonito Boats could revive the preemptive leanings of the Court's early pronouncements 
on the subject. 
The treatise gives no extended treatment to the case, perhaps because the opinion is-
sued so close to the treatise's publication date. Volume II refers to Bonito Boats only in 
footnotes. See, for example, Vol II at 472 n 5, 495 n 3, and 497 n 16. 
•
1 When Professor Goldstein first introduces the subject, he notes that placing ideas 
"outside the subject matter of copyright" is a question of judgment (Vol II at 487-88) ("the 
thorniest interpretational problem"; the "soundest reading of the statute"), but subsequent 
treatments offer as uncontroverted the view that § 301 leaves states free to protect ideas, 
leaving only cross-references to warn the unwary. Vol II at 495, 507. ("Preemption does not, 
however, extend to subject matter such as ideas and facts that fall outside the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter"; "[s]ubject to preemption under the Patent Act, states can 
also protect any 'idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery' from which § 102(b) withholds copyright protection"). See also Vol II at 512, 
528, 624. 
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1976 specifically provides in § 102(b) that copyright does not pro-
tect ideas that might be contained in a work of authorship,52 and 
the reasons for freeing ideas from ownership are strong. (Vol I at 
34-81) The treatise reasons that§ 102(b) should be read as indicat-
ing that ideas are not "within the subject matter of copyright" and 
that their use can therefore be restrained by state law insofar as 
§ 301 is concerned.153 
There is certainly case law and commentary supporting the 
treatise's approach. (Vol II at 488 n 61) But there is also case law 
and commentary going the other way154 that may be of increasing 
interest in light of a recent Supreme Court decision construing the 
e:ff ect of patent law on state intellectual property protection.1515 
Let me outline some of the arguments that might be made in 
support of the opposing view that ideas are within the scope of 
copyright and therefore subject to § 301 preemption. First, it is 
.. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery .. 
. . " § 102(b). 
•• Under this view, a state grant of monetary or injunctive remedies against someone 
who uses another's ideas will be valid under § 301, even if the idea is written down as part of 
a work of authorship and even if the state grant includes control over reproduction, distri-
bution, or other "rights equivalent to copyright." Professor Goldstein notes, however, that 
preemption of state protection for ideas may occur under the Supremacy Clause indepen-
dently of§ 301, Vol II at 489 n 65, 501-02, 529·30, and that the First Amendment may place 
additional limitations on a state's efforts to give property rights (or other dissemination-
reducing rights) in ideas. Vol II at 489, 501-02. He also notes that the states themselves are 
often sensitive to the public interest in leaving ideas free of property-like protection. Vol II 
at 488. 
"' See Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation and Preemption: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 S Ct Rev 509, 566·69; Ralph S. 
Brown, Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common-Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L Rev 
1070, 1092-99 (1977). For case examples see Garrido v Burger King Corp., 558 S2d 79, 81-82 
(Fla App 3d Dist 1990) (claim for conversion and theft of advertising ideas contained in 
written and visual materials held preempted; §§ 301and102 expressly considered); Walker 
v Time-Life Films, 615 F Supp 430, 441 (S D NY 1985) (claim for misappropriation of, inter 
alia, "ideas and concepts" from a book held preempted under § 301), aff'd 784 F2d 44, 53 
(2d Cir 1986); Peckarsky v ABC, 603 F Supp 688, 695-96 (D DC 1984) (unfair competition 
and unfair trade practice claims based on use of facts and (by implication) ideas held pre-
empted under § 301); also see Mitchell v Penton/Industrial Publishing Co., Inc., 486 F 
Supp 22, 26 (N D Ohio 1979) (action for misappropriation of facts preempted; unclear if 
court used § 301 or Supremacy Clause analysis). And see 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 16.04[C] 
at 16-25 n 42 (cited in note 4) (suggesting that ideas may be within the subject matter of 
copyright); and 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.0l[B] at 1-25, 26 n 106 . 
.. Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S Ct 971 (1989). As Professor 
Goldstein notes, Vol II at 502, 529, Supreme Court cases on preemption can help inform 
interpretations of § 301. Although Bonito Boats was decided after the enactment of § 301, it 
makes clear that the Court's earlier decisions favorable to preemption should not be ig-
nored. See note 50. In addition, Bonito Boats is potentially applicable to preemption argu-
ments not based on § 301. See notes 53 and 61. 
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hard to imagine how an idea, once expressed in words or otherwise 
given form, could fail to be part of a "work of authorship," and 
such works are the very subject matter of copyright.56 More 
broadly, it can be argued that the subject matter test in § 301 is 
"intended to distinguish" areas in which Congress drew a deliber-
ate balance from those that Congress left "unattended."57 Under 
this interpretation, the copying of all the elements that Congress 
"attended to" by listing as unprotectable in § 102(b) (such as 
ideas, processes, concepts, systems, discoveries, and perhaps by 
analogy, facts) must be governed solely by federal law.58 
The treatise itself suggests that making ideas incapable of 
ownership is part of an economic calculus that discriminates care-
fully between those elements of a work for which property-like 
protection will further social goals and those for which it will not. 
Under such a view, there seems to be a congressional determina-
tion that ideas are elements of works "within the subject matter of 
copyright" that, in order to further the system's overall goals of 
encouraging knowledge and cultural growth, should not be own-
able. 59 If so, state protection that upsets the calculus would seem 
to be a good candidate for preemption. (Vol II at 477) 
06 To communicate an idea, one ordinarily writes a letter, makes an outline, prepares a 
report, or shows slides: all are "works of authorship" protectable (as to their expression but 
not their ideas) under federal copyright law. (An oral communication containing ideas is 
also potentially a "work of authorship," Vol II at 504-07, but would escape preemption 
under § 301 because it is not fixed in a tangible medium of expression.) 
Two partial exceptions to my view that ideas are almost inevitably part of "works of 
authorship" should be noted. Even a scientific idea, if it is described in a writing or picture, 
is part of a copyrightable "work of authorship," but it is probably more appropriate to 
speak of the potential preemption of state protections for scientific ideas in terms of patent 
law rather than copyright. Also, a scientific idea embodied in a three-dimensional machine 
or structure is probably not part of a "work of authorship" because the Act defines "picto-
rial, graphic and sculptural works" to exclude any "useful article" that has only "mechani-
cal" and "utilitarian" aspects. § 101. 
07 See Ralph S. Brown and Robert C. Denicola, Cases on Copyright, Unfair Competi-
tion, and Other Topics Bearing on the Protection of Literary, Musical and Artistic Works 
490 (Foundation, 4th ed 1985) (raising the possibility). 
•• Under this view, state grants of rights over ideas, processes, and the like would be 
preempted if those intangibles were fixed in a tangible medium of expression and the state 
rights were "equivalent" to rights granted by the Copyright Act. Compare Brown and Den-
icola, Cases on Copyright at 490-92 (cited in note 57). Federal law, such as patent, would be 
available to protect such intellectual products where applicable. 
•• The Nimmer treatise, for example, argues that when Congress denied copyright pro-
tection to ideas it was not excluding them from "the subject matter of copyright," but 
rather was stating "merely a limitation on what elements within such subject matter may be 
considered protectible." 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 16.04[C] at 16-25 n 42 (cited in note 4). 
As the Goldstein treatise notes, works that "fail to meet" copyright's standards for protec-
tions but that fall within the general scope of copyright face potential preemption under § 
301. Vol II at 490. 
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The ends-focused model of copyright's subject matter might 
not lead to results in preemption cases drastically different from 
the results that would be predicted by the treatise. The approach 
suggested would not automatically lead to the preemption of state 
law protection of ideas, since even a court's conclusion that ideas 
were within the overall scope of copyright's subject matter would 
be only one of several hurdles that a defendant must surmount 
before invoking § 301 to defeat a state right.6° Conversely, the ap-
proach advocated by Professor Goldstein would not make all state 
protection for ideas permissible; as Goldstein notes, state protec-
tion for ideas might still be forbidden by the First Amendment 
(Vol II at 489) or preempted by a Supremacy Clause analysis inde-
pendent of §301.61 Each of these alternative avenues, however, has 
difficulties of its own. 62 
Professor Goldstein is one of the commentators who have been 
eloquent and insightful on the importance of free access to ideas. 
(Vol I at 81-83; Vol II at 228) Given this importance, and given the 
uncertainties of using Supremacy Clause and First Amendment 
analyses as safe harbors against state protectionism, analysis of 
§ 30l's preemption of state idea protection should take special 
care not to suggest closure on the issue, at least until the Supreme 
Court has spoken definitively. 
80 See text at note 49. A state contract law, for example, might still survive preemption 
if it provided a "non-equivalent" form of protection for ideas. Vol II at 515, 525, 529-30. 
81 Professor Goldstein suggests that the Supremacy Clause may have independent pre-
emptive force; a state's protection of unfixed works, or ideas and facts contained in fixed 
works, could be preempted if it interfered with overall federal goals. Vol II at 489 n 65, 501, 
529-30. Professor Goldstein notes that this position is debatable, and that some courts 
might look solely to § 301 for preemption analysis. Vol II at 501, 530. 
81 As the treatise notes, it is arguable that § 301 provides the sole benchmark for pre-
emption inquiry, in which case preemption based on an independent Supremacy Clause 
analysis would be unavailable. Vol II at 501. Even assuming that this supplemental analysis 
is available, the appropriate standard for the Supremacy Clause inquiry is not clear. Vol II 
at 495-503, 512. 
As for the First Amendment, Professor Goldstein notes that the Supreme Court has so 
far been reluctant to apply it to intellectual property rights. Vol II at 238-43; 616-18. How-
ever, the Amendment's low profile in the area may be explained by the presence in copy-
right of doctrinal protections for free speech, such as the idea/expression dichotomy (see 
notes 68-70 and accompanying text) and the fair use doctrine. Vol II at 242. The fair use 
doctrine is a flexible privilege to use other's copyrighted material that defies easy summary. 
Described non-exhaustively in § 107, it provides safe harbor for uses that might otherwise 
be infringing. 
Where such doctrines are absent, as they might be in state law, explicit use of the First 
Amendment becomes more likely. Under this view, state intellectual property law could 
gradually become subject to a set of constitutional privileges, not unlike state defamation 
law. See New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964); and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v 
Falwell, 485 US 46 (1988). 
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Professor Goldstein's views on the copyrightability of perva-
sively infringing derivative works and on the preemption status of 
ideas are treated differently by the treatise: they are more retiring 
in one instance, more prominent in the other. But in both cases 
Professor Goldstein meets the challenge of presenting his views in 
a way that is clear and dispassionate. 
D. The Instrumental Model: Applications 
As mentioned above, one of the challenges facing the author 
on copyright is posed by the discipline's somewhat ambiguous nor-
mative structure; the treatise meets this challenge by employing 
throughout a normative instrumental model, called at various 
points "utilitarian" but using largely economic modes of argument. 
(Vol I at 3-13) It is based on the Constitution's Copyright and Pat-
ent Clause, which aims to "promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts."63 Professor Goldstein employs the instrumental 
model as a criterion to analyze current copyright practice and pre-
dict future developments. Though the treatise's use of economics is 
likely to prove somewhat controversial given the ongoing debates 
over copyright's norms, it provides helpful guidance on a surpris-
ingly wide range of topics, and ameliorates a treatise's natural ten-
dency toward discontinuity by providing a consistent framework 
for the treatment of disparate topics. Also, despite the treatise's 
frequent recourse to economic concepts and terminology, Professor 
Goldstein does not view economics as a normative monolith super-
seding all other forms of analysis. Before addressing the normative 
issues on their own terms,64 it may be helpful to review some ex-
amples of. his use of economic language and analysis. 
1. Copyright in U.S. government works. 
Professor Goldstein has long used economics in his work,65 and 
its terminology and concepts obviously come naturally to him. But 
while his summaries introducing new topics tend to be steeped in 
economic vocabulary, his discussion of policy is by no means lim-
ited to economic concepts. For example, in discussing why Con-
gress specified that United· States government works should not be 
•• US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
84 See Section IIB; also see Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A 
Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn L Rev 579 (1985). 
•• See, for example, 30 J Copyright Society USA 209 (cited in note 39); and The Private 
Consumption of Public Goods: A Comment on Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 21 
Bull Copyright Society 204 (1974). 
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copyrightable, 66 Professor Goldstein begins by suggesting that 
Congress preferred supporting these works "by taxes levied at pro-
gressive rates [rather] than by the regressive price mechanism of a 
private property system." (Vol I at 14) It sounds at first as if Pro-
fessor Goldstein sees the only issue to be the best way to provide 
economic incentives for production given the diminishing marginal 
utility of income, but he later discusses the additional issues inher-
ent in the question of whether copyright should subsist in govern-
ment works, such as the importance to our democratic polity of 
giving citizens access to, and the free ability to replicate, the signif-
icant dictates, decisions, and reports of their government. 67 (Vol I 
at 88 n 21, 88-89, 97) It thus gradually becomes clear that econom-
ics is not the sole normative model at work. Indeed, even Gold-
stein's introductory use of economic language (i.e., "regressive 
price mechanism") can be interpreted as an essentially 
noneconomic point: price structures that penalize the poor are to 
be avoided where goods such as access to political materials are at 
issue. 
2. Idea/expression dichtomy. 
Professor Goldstein shows the connections that can exist be-
tween economic and other policy arguments particularly smoothly 
in his discussion of the "idea/expression dichotomy," the doctrine 
in copyright law that copyright protection subsists not in ideas but 
only in the "particular form or collocation of words"68 and other 
expressions of ideas.69 Though this doctrine is probably most com-
.. § 105. 
17 Note, however, that this policy is imperfectly implemented. For example, Congress 
left the question of copyright on state and local governmental works to the judiciaey, L. Ray 
Patterson and Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L Rev 719, 751-55 (1989), and the 
judiciaey has not always fully protected this public interest. See id. 
11 International News Service v Associated Press, 248 US 215, 234 (1918). 
•• Words are not the only mode of expression. Music and pictures, for example, can 
express ideas, too. A symphony transmits not only a particular collocation of notes, but also 
the idea of symphonic form. The former is protectible; the latter is not. 
Similarly, a particular painting might embody an idea, such as that of superimposing 
several views of a figure on itself to convey motion as in Marcel Duchamp's "Nude Descend-
ing a Staircase." Copying the expression of the particular painting would be infringement, 
but copying the underlying idea-even if it originated with the artist copied-would not be. 
However, the question of how much can be copied before "expression" is deemed to be 
taken is always hard to predict, and will be determined case by case. The way one structures 
or marshals ideas can itself be a form of expression, depending on the level of detail and 
other factors. One would imagine that the level of detail copied would have to be fairly high 
before a court would find infringement, but things are not always so. See Roth Greeting 
Cards v United Card Co., 429 F2d 1106 (9th Cir 1970). See also Vol II at 25-26. 
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manly understood in humanistic terms (of cultural value, First 
Amendment interests, and the like), it can also be understood eco-
nomically, as Professor Goldstein demonstrates. He usefully distin-
guishes three kinds of ideas: ideas as marketing concepts, ideas as 
solutions, and ideas as fundamental building blocks. Of the latter 
he says: 
The reason for withholding copyright protection from creative 
building blocks lies in the very object of copyright law: to 
stimulate the production of the most abundant possible array 
of literary, musical and artistic expression. To give creators a 
monopoly over such fundamental .elements would reduce their 
incentive to elaborate these elements into finished works. 
More important, to give one creator a monopoly over these 
basic elements would effectively stunt the efforts of other cre-
ators to elaborate on these elements in the production of their 
own works.70 (Vol I at 78-79) 
3. The subconscious copying rule. 
Recommendations based on analyses of incentives and costs 
inevitably rest on empirical foundations. While one would be un-
likely to challenge the empirical assumptions underlying Professor 
Goldstein's treatment of the non-protectability of basic ideas, one 
might take issue with some of the treatise's other analyses on em-
pirical grounds. For example, in light of his sensitivity to the costs 
copyright is capable of imposing on future authors, Professor Gold-
stein's approval of the rule that subconscious copying triggers lia-
bility is surprising. (Vol II at 162) 
Imposing liability on a second author or artist who was una-
ware he was copying from another's copyrighted work is an appli-
cation of copyright's general strict liability approach, and might be 
defended on several grounds. Most obviously, allowing an "uncon-
sciousness" excuse might encourage a deliberate copyist simply to 
lie about his state of mind. Of course, the attractiveness of this 
consideration is limited by one's confidence in juries' ability to 
10 See also William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copy-
right Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 332, 347-49 (1989) (a more extensive economic analysis of 
the cost-reducing function of nonprotectability). For additional useful discussions of the 
need to protect future authors' abilities to create, see Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 
39 Emory L J - (forthcoming 1990); and David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 
L & Contemp Probs 147 (Autumn 1981). Unfortunately, the courts are often less eager to 
protect future authors than present ones. 
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judge witnesses' truthfulness, and this is not the consideration to 
which Professor Goldstein points. 
Goldstein favors the "subconscious copying" rule apparently 
because he believes that unaware users of others' work could avoid 
such copying at fairly low cost, with just a bit more vigilance. (Vol 
II at 162) This seems an unrealistic expectation, however, at least 
where artists are concerned. Demanding that an artist maintain a 
detailed memory of his predecessors' works could significantly dis-
tort the creative process. 71 The social costs of this distortion need 
to be taken into account under any economic model. Professor 
Goldstein focuses on who "as between the copyright owner and the 
infringer ... is better placed to guard against mistake." (Vol II at 
162) Goldstein is correct that this approach is a familiar one, but it 
seems too narrow, even if a cheapest cost avoider calculus is to be 
applied. The approach suggests that avoiding mistakes is always 
preferable, while in fact sometimes the cost is greater in seeking to 
avoid all mistakes than in allowing some to be made. This is the 
now-hoary lesson of the Hand Formula.72 
In addition, the subconscious copying rule may operate un-
fairly. The person who accidentally and in good faith replicates 
something heard or seen earlier is surprised by the copyright 
owner's claim. Were the penalty merely a requirement that the 
new creator pay the prior creator some fee for use, a finding of 
liability might cause little if any harm. Under copyright law, how-
ever, the unconscious copyist is penalized much further. He has no 
copyright in what he has produced if the prior work was used "un-
lawfully"73 and pervasively, and his aggrieved predecessor may ob-
tain an injunction against the new project, blocking not only the 
dissemination of copied elements but any newly-created ones that 
are intermixed, as well. Although the two parties may negotiate a 
license, this set of rules gives the first creator an extraordinarily 
powerful bargaining position, allowing her to command proceeds 
more fairly attributable to the new author's contributions, since 
she can stop the new project fully in its tracks,74 regardless of how 
much effort, expense, and emotion the new artist has invested. 
Further, the second artist may in fact owe no debt, at least in a 
moral sense, to the person claiming infringement. It is possible 
71 See Litman, 39 Emory L J at :- (cited in note 70). 
71 See United States v Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169 (2d Cir 1947). 
1
• See the discussion in text at notes 37-38. 
74 Professor Goldstein recognizes these remedial problelli!l. Vol I at 7-8; Vol II at 248-
49, 272-80. See also Goldstein, 30 J Copyright Society USA at 236-39 (cited in note 39). 
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that sometimes even an artist's subconscious forgets a composition 
encountered years earlier, and the similarity of form is merely co-
incidence. But the law at present cannot distinguish such cases.75 
Juries often infer a causal connection between the access years ago 
and the creation today with a logic that is practically, though not 
formally, irrefutable. 76 
One's opinion of the subconscious copying rule may depend on 
one's view of the creative process. I find it hard to imagine that 
subconscious copying only occurs through carelessness, or that it 
can be avoided at minimal cost. Under what one might call an "in-
fluence" view of creativity, subconscious copying occurs constantly, 
and usually bears valuable fruit. 
One such view is contained in the theories of critic Harold 
Bloom, who suggests that all art is a creative misreading of one's 
predecessors, a Freudian rebellion against what came before;77 seen 
this way, all works are potentially derivative.78 Terry Eagleton 
summarizes Professor Bloom's view as follows: 
[A]ny particular poem can be read as an attempt to escape 
this 'anxiety of influence' by its systematic remoulding of a 
previous poem. The poet, locked in Oedipal rivalry with his 
castrating 'precursor' will seek to disarm that strength by en-
tering it from within, writing in a way which revises, displaces 
and recasts the precursor poem; in this sense all poems can be 
read as rewritings of other poems .... 79 
With the past at the center of their work, many artists could 
not function if a catalogue of that past, and lawyer-like attention 
1
• See Litman, 39 Emory L J at - (cited in note 70) (suggesting the impossibility of 
empirically distinguishing between subconscious copying and coincidence). Professor Lit-
man does not recommend abandoning the subconscious copying rule, however; rather, like 
Professor Goldstein, she focuses on other devices to preserve the public domain. 
78 Goldstein discusses the functioning of the "access" and "substantial similarity" rules 
in copyright infringement. Vol II at 7-21. 
77 See Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (Oxford, 1973). 
78 Technically speaking, a work is not derivative unless a substantial amount of protect-
able expression has been taken from the prior work; if that expression has been taken with-
out permission, the derivative work infringes. A work that takes only ideas, themes, or other 
nonprotectable elements from prior works is neither an infringement nor a derivative work. 
(Vol I at 222) At issue here, however, is the chilling effect on artists, and artists are not 
usually copyright experts. Thus, the fact that a work could be a potential infringement is as 
important in practical terms as actual infringement. 
79 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction 183 (U Minn, 1983). Though 
Eagleton here is faithfully replicating the male imagery of the Freudian Oedipus complex, in 
my view the same dynamics-of feeling and fighting the influence of those who have shaped 
one's vision in order to "clear a space for [one's] own imaginative reality"-are operative in 
much women's writing as well. 
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to whether the things borrowed are "idea" or "expression," become 
prerequisites for publication. As Benjamin Kaplan has suggested, 
the romantic notion of independent creativity is fairly new, but has 
had an unfortunately strong impact on copyright;80 the classical 
approach to art understood and honored (albeit overmuch) the role 
the past plays in the new.81 
When the subconscious copying rule is linked with the ubiq-
uity of communications media, a real threat to new artists may 
emerge. Writers seem to perceive it already. For example, a recent 
award-winning story depicts the supposed state of art midway in 
the twenty-first century, when virtually everything composable has 
been composed.82 The author, Spider Robinson, argues strongly for 
a limited copyright term; he envisions composers' despair if re-
peated denials of copyright were to force them to conclude that 
most of their new compositions were drawn from music that they· 
had heard before. 83 
Exaggerated as Robinson's story may be, its general point is 
sound: copyright exists for future authors and audiences as much 
as for present authors and listeners. Only a heightened sensitivity 
to possible future dangers can protect persons not here to speak 
80 
"[T]he new literary criticism, I suggest, tended to justify strong protection of intel-
lectual structures in some respect 'new,' to encourage a more suspicious search for appropri-
ations even of the less obvious types, and to condemn these more roundly when found." 
Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright at 24 (cited in note 2) (citations omitted). 
81 Id at 22-25. 
81 See Spider Robinson, Melancholy Elephants, in Isaac Asimov and Martin H. Green-
berg, eds, The New Hugo Winners: Award-Winning Science Fiction Stories 99, 106-11 
(Wynwood, 1989) (I am indebted to Jessica Litman, in 39 Emory L J - (cited in note 70) 
for directing me to the Spider Robinson story). 
9
• Robinson, Melancholy Elephants at 106-11. The story does not specify why copy-
right is denied in unconsciously derivative works. I attribute the denials to § 103(a). How-
ever, the story may erroneously be supposing that novelty (part of the standard for patenta-
bility) rather than originality is the relevant standard for protectability in copyright. This 
error does not undermine the theme's basic validity, as the categories of novelty and origi-
nality tend to overlap as a functional matter if three conditions obtain: (1) the "unconscious 
copying" rule; (2) the likelihood that a large proportion of everything composed or created 
in a given field has been encountered by virtually everyone in that field; and (3) the rule of 
§ 103(a) that copyright protection does not extend to any part of a work in which another's 
copyrighted work has been used unlawfully. (On the latter, see discussion in text at notes 
37-38.) Thus, if one has heard all the relevant compositions and composes a song that re-
sembles throughout and in substantial part an existing composition bearing a current copy-
right, the Dew song would probably be found to be using the prior song "unlawfully" and 
would not be entitled to copyright. In this way, the explicit requirement of originality could 
become in practice nearly a requirement of novelty. Goldstein raises a related point. Vol I at 
66-67. (I am indebted for this point to students in my Theoretical Foundations of Intellec-
tual Property Law seminar.) 
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for themselves, and take account of the costs and benefits that cur-
rent policies will bear for future generations. 
Though Professor Goldstein favors the subconscious copying 
rule, that does not mean he is unaware of these concerns. Rather, 
his assent to the rule may bespeak his preference for other re-
sponses. 84 Professor Goldstein's approach to preserving the public 
domain appears to vary with the type of expression and use being 
considered. For example, he recognizes the limited vocabulary 
available for musical composition (Vol I at 133, 224-25; Vol II at 
82-86), and seems to advocate a more demanding "originality" 
standard for copyrighting music than other works.85 (Vol I at 137, 
224-25) With respect to the idea/expression question, his approach 
is different. Here Professor Goldstein prefers to preserve free use 
of the "building blocks of creation" in close cases not by denying 
copyright in minimally expressive works, but by adjusting the in-
fringement standard (i.e., judicially shrinking the reach of the au-
thor's exclusive rights). Under this approach, the plaintiff seeking 
to enforce copyright in a minimally expressive work would be re-
quired to prove something approaching exact replication. (Vol I at 
79-80) Reconsideration of the subconscious copying rule could add 
valuably to this repertoire of tools for preserving productive in-
terchange between present and prior creators. 
II. NEW VERSUS OLD AUTHORS AND THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE 
CENSORSHIP: LOOKING BEHIND THE TEXTS 
Virtually all the issues canvassed above embody the tension 
inherent in any attempt to honor the interests of two generations 
of creators. For example, the essay has discussed the need for new 
adaptive artists to have a copyright in their own productions; the 
dangers that the "subconscious copying rule" poses to new cre-
ators, particularly in an age of ubiquitous media; and the impor-
tance of a vigorous preemption doctrine to preserve artists' liberty 
to use their predecessors' ideas lest state intellectual property pro-
tection erode the freedom that Congress meant to confer by with-
84 When and if the exhaustion of possibilities pictured by the Robinson story in fact 
approaches, rejecting the doctrine of subconscious copying is only one possibility. The term 
of copyright might also be shortened, the scope of protectible subject matter reduced, the 
"originality" and "authorship" prerequisites for copyright stiffened, the variety of available 
remedies restricted, or the reach of the owners' exclusive rights curtailed. 
85 He also appears to approve special handling for music infringement cases. (Vol II at 
84, 86) 
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holding ownership of ideas. The instant section examines that ten-
sion directly. 
A. On Keeping the Costs of Creation Low: Is There Shelter for 
the Necessary Freedom to Borrow? 
The primary tool for accommodating the interests of new gen-
erations is the idea/expression dichotomy, which seeks to assure 
that the fundamental building blocks of creation can be used 
freely, with no need to seek out and bargain with the party who 
placed the idea in the stream of culture. But it is far from clear 
that courts today are using the doctrine to safeguard this necessary 
freedom with the requisite vigilance. The line between "ideas" and 
"expression" is, not surprisingly, a hazy one, and should a new art-
ist happen across the line he will be guilty of creating an unautho-
rized derivative work. 
An artist who takes only "ideas" and not "expression" may 
still not be safe. The Goldstein treatise's position on preemption 
suggests that the author of the prior work may be able to maintain 
a state law cause of action. In discussing the applicability of the 
European doctrine of "moral rights" in this country, for example, 
the treatise points out that although American law lacks an ex-
plicit analogue to the Continental right of "integrity," an author 
may be able to obtain protection against "travesties" of his work 
under federal law if expression is used, and under state law even 
though only ideas are being used.ss (Vol II at 635, 645) 
Yet, as Harold Bloom's evocative model of the creative process 
suggests, art sometimes requires the hostile use of predecessors' 
work.s7 The author of a new work is unlikely to obtain permission 
from a prior author if he wishes to criticize the prior work or use 
the prior author's material in a way that rejects or undercuts the 
meaning the predecessor meant to invest in her materials or sym-
bols. It may be precisely the travesty that is most in the need of 
freedom.ss 
" The so-called "integrity" right is a protection against distortion, and thus a power of 
manipulation: it allows an author to say "This is my symbol, my character, my image: use it 
only as I want you to use it. If you think my use distorts a truth, you must find some way to 
address that problem without making direct use of my distortion." 
•
7 While one might disagree with Bloom's view that "creative misreadings" of what bas 
come before is essential to the creation of all new poems, it surely describes accurately an 
important part of many authors' aesthetic maturation . 
.. Compare Tom Stoppard, Travesties 85-87 (Grove, 1975); see also George Orwell, 
1984 32-33 (Signet Penguin, 1981) (indicating the importance of being able to utilize "docu-
mentary proof' to resist the state's power to redefine language and truth). 
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It is true that "creative misprision" (to use Bloom's phrase 
describing the habit of artists to misread their predecessors) can 
often proceed without infringing a prior work. But that is not al-
ways the case. For example, central to the post-modernist move-
ment in art is commenting on existing culture, often by employing 
the specific icons and images others have popularized.89 Whether 
the art at issue is a photo-collage showing the Statue of Liberty 
swimming for her freedom90 or a retelling of Hamlet from the point 
of view of its minor characters,91 much art might not be created if 
consent were required from the person whose work is being com-
mented on. More generally, an artist or speaker sometimes needs 
to use the expressions, symbols, and characters that represent what 
he is attempting to rebut, integrate, or criticize in order to make 
his point clearly. In holding that the state may not criminally pros-
ecute someone for burning a flag in political protest, even the Su-
preme Court has recognized that the hostile use of symbols 
originated by others can be essential to self-expression.92 
We are social creatures, and there are many symbols less noble 
than the flag that have a power over our minds. As the Court ob-
served, "Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communi-
cating ideas ... a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations 
. . . and ... groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a 
flag or banner, a color or design."93 Advertisers and entertainment 
conglomerates also seek to knit loyalty through the use of symbols. 
89 
"The referent in post-Modern art is no longer 'nature,' but the closed system of 
fabricated signs that make up our environment." John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic 
Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 103, 111 (1988). 
Carlin argues that "some arrangement needs to be developed whereby artists' traditional 
freedom to depict the environment in which they live and work is upheld." Id at 140-41. 
There is an art form known as "appropriation" that consists of making an audience see pre-
existing art in a new light or take a different stance toward it. Sometimes it involves making 
substantial changes; sometimes it does not. See generally id. 
90 As in Michael Langenstein's "Swimmer of Liberty," pictured in Latman, Gorman & 
Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties at 159 (cited in note 28) (though I speculate about the 
reasons for Ms. Liberty's dip). 
91 As in Tom Stoppard's Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead (Grove Press, 1967). 
•• See Texas v Johnson, 491 US -, 109 S Ct 2533, 2538-40 (1989); and United States v 
Eichman, 1990 US LEXIS 3087. But see The San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v United 
States Olympic Committee, 483 US 522 (1987) (unauthorized use of the word "Olympics" to 
promote the Gay Olympics, a non-profit athletic event, violates the U.S. Olympic Commit-
tee's property right in the word). 
I use the flag cases heuristically rather than doctrinally. As a matter of First Amend-
ment doctrine, there are various grounds upon which the cases can be distinguished from 
intellectual property cases. 
93 Johnson, 109 S Ct at 2539, quoting West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v Barnette, 319 US 624, 
632 (1943). 
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To free one's self or one's neighbors from an unquestioning loyalty, 
or simply to retain cultural vitality, it is sometimes necessary to 
use a received symbol in an unexpected way, a way that the origi-
nators would not have wanted. As was observed when the Disney 
organization successfully restrained a counter-cultural comic par-
ody of Mickey Mouse that implicitly mocked both Disney and the 
suburban lifestyle legitimated in the Disney canon: 
Prodigious success and its responsibilities and failures draws 
parody. That's how a culture defends itself. Especially from 
institutions so large that they lose track of where they stop 
and the world begins so that they try to exercise their internal 
model of control on outside activities.94 
How might these necessary freedoms be preserved? The rec-
ommendations briefly canvassed in the first parts of this review es-
say may not provide a sufficiently safe harbor for a hostile use that 
a copyright owner wants to suppress. Even if the idea/expression 
dichotomy is respected, and state control of ideas preempted, it is 
possible that a second creative person will take enough of the first 
copyrighted work's expression to be viewed as infringing. Even a 
rejection of the judicial rule that imposes liability for "subcon-
scious copying" would be irrelevant if the second artist used the 
prior work deliberately. And even if the statutory provision deny-
ing copyright to derivative works that are fully intermixed with 
prior works were repealed, the second author would still be unable 
to distribute what he has made without the permission of the first 
author.915 
How would we go about discovering whether current law re-
spects the value of these hostile uses, and whether it could legiti-
mately give them a greater freedom than other uses from charges 
of infringement? Is it appropriate under current law to take into 
account the value of hostile works and the special difficulties they 
face?96 
" Stewart Brand, Dan O'Neill Defies U.S. Supreme Court: A Really Truly Silly Mo-
ment in American Law, Coevolution Q 41 (Spring 1979). 
11 The question of whether a derivative work can have a copyright is separate from the 
question of whether another party also has a copyright-based legal interest in the derivative 
work. See § 106 (author's exclusive rights). The rights of several persons routinely co-exist 
in the same work or object. See, for example, Gordon, 41 Stan L Rev at 1361-65 (cited in 
note 50) (common law doctrines such as tort and property), and 1422-25 (conflicts among 
intangible and tangible property entitlements). 
.. I am addressing here only the threshold question of whether some special considera-
tion should be given to hostile uses. I do not suggest that all hostile uses should automati-
cally be permitted; the question of what weight to give to the factors discussed here, and 
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Their preservation, given current law, is best ensured through 
relatively open-ended doctrines such as fair use,97 the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy,98 and, possibly, the infringement, originality, or 
authorship standards. These several doctrines tend to be used eq-
uitably-not in the procedural sense but in Aristotle's, wherein eq-
uity is a means of correcting for the law's inevitable overinclusive-
ness. 99 But the purpose and justification of such flexible doctrines 
is usually that they allow the judge or other decisionmaker "to say 
what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, 
and would have put into_his law if he had known."100 Even equity, 
then, must be consistent with the norms of the existing legal· re-
gime, and we must identify the goals of that regime in order to 
determine whether giving a significant degree of freedom to hostile 
works is legitimate within it. Clearly, that is a task beyond the 
how they might be appropriately accommodated within copyright doctrine, is outside the 
scope of this essay. Thus, I do not examine whether it would be desirable to look at an 
individual copyright owner's possible suppression motives-as Judge Oakes has suggested 
might be done under the "clean hands" doctrine when injunctions are sought, New Era 
Publications Int'l, ApS v Henry Holt, 873 F2d 576, 589 n 5 (concurring opinion) (case dis-
cussed in note 1)-or whether the possibility of censorship might be better taken into ac-
count in some other manner, as by adopting presumptions applicable to broad types of 
works. 
07 The statutory section on fair use in fact singles out "criticism and comment" as de-
serving of solicitude, § 107, and parody has long been considered an important exercise of 
fair use. See, for example, Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Burlesque and the Economic Ration· 
ale of Copyright, 4 Conn L Rev 615 (1979). These are types of works that a copyright owner 
may well wish to censor, and their special status may indicate that private censorship 
should be taken into account as a general matter. But current fair use doctrine does not 
offer a determinative answer to the question; fair use questions are decided on a case-by-
case basis, New Era Publications Int'l, ApS, v Carol Publishing Group, 1990 US App 
LEXIS 8726 (2d Cir), and while some opinions suggest a sensitivity to these issues, see id, 
also see Rosemont Enterprises v Random House, 366 F2d 303, 311-13 (2nd Cir 1966) (Lum-
bard, C.J., concurring), others do not. See New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v Henry Holt, 
873 F2d 576, 583-84 (discussed in note 1). The Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion in 
a case involving suppression, offering to date only dicta that is sparse and ambiguous. See 
for example, Stewart v Abend, 1990 US LEXIS 2184. 
•• I mean to include in this category the judicially-created doctrines that preserve free-
dom for ideas even when they are inextricably bound with expression; in particular, the 
doctrine of merger (see Vol I at 80) and the doctrine that the standard of infringement can 
be heightened for expression that permits only limited variation. See Continental Casualty 
Co. v Beardsley, 253 F2d 702, 706 (2d Cir 1958) ("the proper standard of infringement is 
one which will protect as far as possible the copyrighted language and yet allow free use of 
the thought beneath the language"). 
•• Aristotle writes, "When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it 
which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us 
and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission ••.. " Aristotle, 10 Ethics, in The 
Nicomachean Ethics 133, D. Ross trans, revised by J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson (Oxford, 
1984). 
100 Id. 
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scope of this essay. Nevertheless, some useful observations about 
both methodology and substance can be proffered even in this 
brief compass. 
B. Identifying Relevant Principles and Policies 
There are at least two possible referents when searching for 
antecedents consistent with giving hostile works some degree of 
freedom: copyright itself, viewed as an isolated set of doctrines, or 
copyright within the context of the law as a whole. Let us begin 
with the copyright law, canvassing briefly some of the available 
principles and policies, and then examining what the Goldstein 
treatise has to say about the copyright statute's purposes. As al-
ready mentioned, copyright has one dominant purpose but many 
subsidiary ones, and it is not yet clear from either Congress or the 
courts how the various policies should be ranked and weighted. 
The essay will explore this mix of purposes and ways we might 
resolve the problem this mixture poses. 
1. Maximizing social welfare. 
There are many norms by which a property system might be 
judged or justified. One type of justification is instrumental and 
aggregative, producing legal rules dictated by a social welfare func-
tion aimed at maximizing some particular variable. In copyright, 
the three most salient candidates for maximization are dollars (ec-
onomic value "as measured by ... willingness to pay"), 101 utility, 
and the "progress of science."102 
Each of these variables has its own definitional ambiguities 
and internal variations, but their major deficiencies and strengths 
are fairly clear and familiar. The chief advantage of economic in-
quiry is that dollars are measurable; the chief disadvantage is that 
its criterion of value reflects existing distributions of wealth. The 
strength of utilitarianism is that it treats people as equals regard-
less of wealth; yet utility is difficult or impossible to measure and 
to compare interpersonally. The "progress of science" is the consti-
tutional explanation for copyright, but it too is difficult to mea-
sure, and its use as a criterion poses an additional institutional dif-
ficulty: judges who have been admonished by years of copyright 
jurisprudence to beware the inexpertise of "persons trained only to 
101 See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 9 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 
1986). 
10
• See Brown, 70 Minn L Rev 579 (cited in note 64). 
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the law" in evaluating cultural worth103 might be required to deter-
mine whether protecting a given work, or freeing a given use from 
a copyright owner's claim of protection, would better advance the 
progre!3s of knowledge.104 
In seeking to maximize social welfare, moreover, each of these 
approaches seems to suffer from another potential defi-
ciency-paying insufficient attention to individuals. Under an ag-
gregative inquiry, the interests of a person who has done nothing 
morally culpable can be sacrificed in order to serve the "greater 
good" (however measured).105 
2. Authors' rights. 
The authors' rights tradition contains two strands that are 
commonly blended, 106 but that in intellectual property law raise 
separate issues and play separate roles meriting individual treat-
ment.107 One strand is restitutionary. It has to do with securing, for 
those who create works of value, reward for their "just deserts." It 
can be viewed in various multiple ways: as a form of corrective jus-
108 Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 US 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes). 
104 Alternatively, the progress of science criterion could be applied to types of work or 
the system as a whole, rather than to individual works. See Mitchell Brothers Film Group v 
Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F2d 852, 860 (5th Cir 1979). 
10
• See Ursula LeGuin, Those Who Walk Away from Ornelas, in The Wind's Twelve 
Quarters 224 (Harper & Row, 1975) (powerful allegory of a culture dependent on allowing 
harm to innocents). In practice, aggregative approaches may not lead to such extreme re-
sults. Mitchell Polinsky reminds us, for example, that persons whose interests are sacrificed 
in the pursuit of economic efficiency can be rewarded by transfer payments after the "larger 
pie" has been created. A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 7-10, 
119-127 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1983). Even without transfer payments, utilitarianism would 
yield significant protection for individual interests. See, for example, Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1224 (1967) (both the utilitarian and fairness approaches to 
the Fifth Amendment yield significant protections for existing property entitlements, with 
utility, surprisingly, sometimes protecting entitlements that a pure fairness approach might 
not). 
10
• Although these strands are usually seen as nonaggregative, they are also often inter-
twined with aggregative instrumental arguments. See, for example, David Ladd, The Harm 
of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J Copyright Society USA 421, 425-26 (1983). 
m For an interesting investigation of one form that the restitutionary and personality 
approaches might take, and comparisons between them, see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy 
of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L J 287 (1988). See also, Alfred C. Yen, Restoring 
the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St L J 491 (forthcoming 
1990); Gordon, 41 Stan L Rev at 1446-69 (cited in note 50); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying 
Intellectual Property, 18 Phil & Pub Aff 31 (1989); Gordon, Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse (draft manuscript, cited in note 41); and Wendy J. Gordon, Owning 
the Fruits of Creative Labor: Boundaries and Limits in Intellectual Property (draft manu-
script on file with the University of Chicago Law Review). 
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tice, 108 holding that the person who creates value should be paid 
for it, just as (arguably) those who generate harm should be made 
to compensate their victims;109 as an offshoot of Lockean labor the-
ory;110 as a notion of fairness; as a sort of strict liability for bene-
fits; or as a variant of the law of unjust enrichment. The key notion 
in this branch of the so-called "authors' rights" or "natural rights" 
tradition is the claim to some reward, which might take the form 
of a claim to control. 
The second "authors' rights" strand has to do with an author's 
personal stake in what she has made. It too can be found in 
Locke, 111 though arguably only with some strain, and its defenders 
often make use of the work of Hegel and his interpreters.112 Its 
proponents might emphasize that "[w]e have the feeling of our 
personality being in some inexplicable way extended to encompass 
the objects we own."113 If people experience such cathexis to ordi-
nary items of property, then how much closer, it is thought, must 
be the connection of the author to his creative works? Or propo-
nents of the "personality view" might argue that property contrib-
utes to "self-actualization ... personal expression ... dignity and 
recognition as an individual person,"114 and that control over one's 
intellectual products is a form of property uniquely suited to these 
ends. 
Searching for a definitive ordering among these policies and 
principles, the reader learns four things from the Goldstein trea-
tise. First, one learns that an "instrumental" model, which views 
authors' rights simply as a tool for drawing from creators some-
thing that will benefit the public, is dominant in copyright (Vol I 
at 5-8 and nn 5-8). No determinate criterion of public benefit is 
specified; the yardstick of social desirability may be impact on 
"culture and education" (Vol I at 3, 4-5 n 1), economic value as 
measured by willingness to pay (Vol II at 190), or the sheer variety 
1
•• All of these issues are examined in more depth in Gordon, Intellectual Property and 
the Restitutionary Impulse (draft manuscript, cited in note 41). 
1
•• Compare George Sher, Desert 69-90 (Princeton, 1987). 
11
• See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Gouernment, ch 5 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1952). 
Also see Gordon, Owning the Fruits of Creatiue Labor (draft of manuscript cited in note 
107); and Hughes, 77 Georgetown L J at 296-330 (cited in note 107). 
111 See, for example, Karl Olivecrona, Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on 
the Origin of Property, 35 J Hist Ideas 211 (1974); Karl Olivecrona, Locke's Theory of Ap-
propriation, 24 Phil Q 220, 225 (1974). 
111 See Hughes, 77 Georgetown L J at 330-66 (cited in note 107); and Margaret Jane 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan L Rev 957 (1982). 
us Olivecrona, 35 J Hist Ideas at 215 (cited in note 111). 
114 Hughes, 77 Georgetown L J at 330 (cited in note 107). 
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of works (Vol I at 197); or social desirability may be a value judg-
ment left to Congress. (Vol I at 7) Second, one learns that the 
dominant instrumental model is not absolute (Vol I at 8-9; Vol II 
at 685-86): that the instrumental language of the Copyright and 
Patent Clause of the Constitution places only a "loose harness" on 
Congress (Vol II at 196); that considerations of "just" reward may 
have a proper if subordinate place in copyright (Vol I at 514-16 
and n 9); and that the law even seeks to protect some of an au-
thor's personality interests, at least in some contexts (Vol I at 8-9 
and at 515-16; Vol II at 249-50 and n 14, 191 n 11), though such 
protection may not be appropriate in others. (Vol II at 191-92) 
Third, and most important for the instant discussion, one learns 
by implication that there is no definitive ordering, no place in the 
case law or statute that will tell us where one of several legitimate 
policies is capable of extending or limiting the reach of another. 
Various observers have suggested the same, arguing for example 
that the Supreme Court has been less than consistent in deciding 
whether notions of "desert" play any proper role in copyright.115 
Given this ambiguous mix of policies, with instrumentalism 
dominant but not exclusive, how should the equitable doctrines be 
construed? One might handle suppression cases by assessing the 
underlying policy concerns implicated by each fact pattern and de-
ciding, according to some calculus, whether enforcing the author's 
prima facie rights of control or giving the hostile user the freedom 
to copy best serves the relevant goals. But, as noted above, deter-
mining the relevant calculus to accommodate the various goals is 
at this stage of copyright's development a difficult matter. This is 
not a sign of copyright's immaturity as a discipline; virtually all 
legal doctrines contain a mix of policies competing for strength.116 
There may well be no "plateau" at which all the relevant norms 
will come into equilibrium. 
Another way to handle the mix of policies is to minimize the 
conflict by identifying some dominant purpose. Thus, one might 
identify providing economic incentives as the dominant purpose of 
copyright, and recommend that special consideration be given to 
users whenever the copyright owner's motivations differ from that 
approved motive. That is the approach the Goldstein treatise takes 
11
• See, for example, William W. Fisher ill, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
Harv L Rev 1659 (1988). 
118 See, for example, Arthur A. Leff, Law And ... , 87 Yale L J 989 (1978)(arguing that 
such mixes are inevitable). 
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on the suppression question, for example.117 Professor Goldstein 
argues that protection need not be given to a copyright owner who 
seeks to pursue "non-copyright interests," (Vol II at 191-92) de-
fined apparently as any interest other than an interest in moneta-
rily exploiting the work.118 
A third way of reconciling these diverse policies is to investi-
gate whether there is any result on which all relevant policies can 
converge. It is to this possibility that I now turn. 
C. Safeguarding Hostile Uses from Suppression: A Search for 
Converging Policies 
The treatise suggests that the two major strains in copyright 
are the economic or instrumental perspective, and the authors' 
rights perspective. This dual perspective parallels the configuration 
in property and tort law as a whole, where quandaries such as the 
suppression problem are sometimes analyzed in terms of whether 
the individual holding an entitlement is a "steward" entrusted 
with the resource solely for the social good that is likely to result 
from his productive use of it, or a "sovereign" to be left unregu-
lated in managing the resource.119 Despite their potential for con-
flict, the sovereignty and stewardship models often generate results 
that converge.120 It may be that copyright's various normative 
strands can be similarly reconciled in regard to particular issues. I 
shall suggest that in regard to at least some suppression is-
sues-notably, those involving authors who have already made the 
117 A similar approach was taken in Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum L 
Rev 1600, 1632-35 (1982) ("anti-dissemination motives"). 
118 He suggests that privacy for unpublished works may appropriately receive some def-
erence, however. See Vol II at 191-92 n 11. 
119 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv 
L Rev 1137, 1139-41 (1990) (implicitly addressing sovereignty and stewardship models). 
In intellectual property law, the sovereignty model correlates roughly with the "authors' 
rights" perspective. The stewardship model corresponds most closely with the economic per-
spective, and it also has echoes in the notion that copyright serves First Amendment values. 
See Vol II at 238-43 (First Amendment). 
m It is their convergence in the usual case that permits their continued coexistence as 
competing perspectives. For example, one way to serve the "social good" is, arguably, to 
respect individual owners' investments in their property; compare Michelman, 80 Harv L 
Rev 1165 (cited in note 105) (utility arguments support paying compensation to owners dis-
advantaged by government activity in a fairly wide range of instances). Similarly, a way to 
serve the economic health of a society is, arguably, to honor owners' decisions as to how 
their property should be used. This latter argument is, at its extreme, Adam Smith's "invisi-
ble hand" notion. 
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copyrighted work part of the public debate or consciousness121-it 
may be possible to reach some consensus among the competing 
policies and principles, thus rendering it unnecessary to choose one 
dominant strand on which to rely. But such an analysis requires 
that one voyage some distance beyond the explicit words of the 
copyright statute. 
1. The economics of suppression. 
It may seem odd to contend that second-guessing an owner's 
decision about whether or not to license or sell a resource can be 
consistent with economics. In the suppression context, however, 
there exist many well-recognized economic phenomena that should 
diminish our confidence that the owner's decisions will in fact tend 
toward the "maximization of economic value" in any meaningful 
sense. Consider, for example, a historian who denies a hostile critic 
permission to quote fairly extensively from her book, or sets an 
extremely high price-say, $10,000-which she believes will be the 
amount lost in revenues if the critic's hostile review is published. 
Also assume that the review would be ineffective without the quo-
tations. If the critic, who stands to make, say, $500 from the re-
view, declines to purchase a license but publishes the quotations 
nevertheless, and the historian sues, the following reasons counsel 
that the courts not assume that because the historian's price was 
higher than the critic's offer it would produce more "value" to en-
join the unconsented use of the quotations rather than to allow 
distribution of the review. 
First, the critic's fee is unlikely to represent all the value that 
publication of the review will bring to the affected audience, in 
part because the market for such goods rarely if ever gives their 
sellers a price that captures the resulting surplus.122 Thus, the 
buyer's likely maximum offer ($499) is likely to significantly under-
state the actual value of the use in her hands. 
Second, the historian's minimum price of $10,000 is likely to 
significantly overstate the social value of the quotations remaining 
solely in the historian's hands, since much of that amount reflects 
121 The arguments that follow apply most strongly to the enforcement of copyright in 
published works. -
122 See Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development, 4 
Rand J Econ 527, 527 (1986) (in the absence of price discrimination, a firm that invests in 
research and development "will be unable to appropriate all of the surplus generated by the 
licensing of its R & D"). Whether the historian's similar inability would exceed the critic's 
would be an empirical question. 
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mere pecuniary loss: if the review is published, many consumers of 
historical works will simply shift their purchases to other (perhaps 
better) historians, and there may be no net social loss at all.123 
There may even be a social benefit if an inferior history is ignored 
and a better one supported by the reading public. 
Third, the historian's reputation and image are involved, and 
when such irreplaceable items are at stake "income" or "wealth" 
effects become significant.124 When goods as important and irre-
placeable as life or reputation are on the table persons are unlikely 
to sell what they own at any price;125 yet if they have no legal enti-
tlement to the thing at issue, their ability to buy it is limited by 
their available resources. In such cases, 126 where the effect of the 
initial grant of entitlements is so strong that it may well determine 
where the resource rests in the final analysis, the results of consen-
sual bargains cannot be relied upon to yield any independent in-
formation about "value." 
Of course, the above discussion is quite summary.127 Neverthe-
less, it should suggest why the copyright owner's pursuit of a non-
monetary interest could give an economically-oriented court spe-
cial reason to inquire into the weight of the affected interests 
rather than simply deferring to the plaintiff's claim of right. 
2. Authors' rights and suppression. 
The authors' rights approach has, as mentioned, two principal 
lines of argument, one resting largely on the perceived appropriate-
ness of rewarding valuable labor, the other on the perception that 
m See Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 440-41 (forthcoming, 
Harvard 1990) (using such effects to explain why landowners who create certain positive 
spillovers are not entitled to payment from those who benefit). 
"' Income effects are, roughly, the impact on one's preference brought about by a 
change in wealth, including the change brought about by being given, or being denied, an 
entitlement. See, for example, E.J. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An 
Interpretive Essay, 9 J Econ Lit 1, 18-21 (1971) ("income" or "welfare" effects illustrated 
arithmetically); see also Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Posses-
sion, 51 Ohio St L J at 518-19 (cited in note 107) ("filp flop" of rights). 
120 See Fisher v Dees, 794 F2d 432, 437 (9th Cir 1987) (in the case of parody, " [s]elf-
esteem is seldom strong enough to permit the granting of permission even in exchange for a 
reasonable fee."). 
128 Compare Ronald H. Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in R. H. Coase, 
The Firm, the Market, and the Law 157, 170-74 (U Chicago, 1988) (suggesting that income 
effects are unlikely to be significant in contexts not involving irreplaceable goods such as, in 
this context, reputation or self-esteem). 
127 For further exploration, see Wendy J. Gordon, The Right Not to Use: Nonuse and 
Suppression in Intellectual Property, (draft manuscript on file with the University of Chi-
cago Law Review). 
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authors have a special personal attachment to their works. While 
conceivably either of these strands could be employed to argue 
that authors should be free to suppress others' unfriendly use of 
their work, such an argument does not inevitably follow from the 
arguments' terms. To the contrary, attention to questions of 
proper reward or personal development and psychological cathexis 
may better indicate that the power to suppress should not be given 
to artists. 
Turning first to the restitutionary strain of argument, it ap-
pears to rest on the notion that a person should retain the benefits 
she generates. That notion in turn might be traced to any one of a 
number of arguments: a strict view of personal responsibility, per-
haps, suggesting that every individual should keep the benefits she 
generates and pay for the harm she does; or perhaps a notion that 
the existing balance of goods among persons warrants respect as a 
prima facie matter, so that any unjustified taking of a benefit or 
imposition of a harm causes an imbalance or inequality that de-
mands recompense. But these notions tend to be symmetrical;128 
they suggest that if "pay for the benefits you receive from others" · 
is a relevant principle, so is "do no harm to others," or "pay for the 
harm you do others." If so, the author's right is limited by the very 
consideration that supports it. An author under an obligation to 
refrain from harm is not at liberty to withdraw her work at will 
from the use of those whom it has affected. 
Another possible foundation for the restitutionary strain in 
"natural rights" argument is Lockean labor theory. Here, too, non-
owners' rights against harm have an important role. A harm-based 
limitation on property rights is captured in Locke's theory by his 
proviso: one who labors in the common to draw forth water from 
the lake or pick apples from the field is entitled to that to which 
his labor is joined, as (arguably) is an artist who labors to give ex-
pression to ideas he draws from the public domain, but only so 
long as "enough and as good" is left for others.129 If that proviso is 
not met-if giving exclusive dominion to the laborer will leave 
others worse off than they would have been in his absence-then 
the laborer is not entitled to property rights in what he has taken. 
128 In fact, if there were an asymmetry, it would probably be to give a stronger right 
against harm than to recapture benefits. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va L 
Rev 625, 671-72 (1985) (suggesting that such an assymetry exists in the common law). 
12
• See Locke, Second Treatise ch 5, '1 27 (cited in note 110). The condition that 
"enough and as good" be left for others is commonly known as the proviso or sufficiency 
condition. 
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The structure of this argument gives primacy to the harm 
principle, as it should, since it can be argued that Locke's affirma-
tive argument also derives from a harm principle. To see this, con-
sider Locke's primary argument for property:130 Locke first argues 
that each of us has a property in his body and the labor of his 
body. Second, he posits that when one appropriates things from 
the common-picking apples, drawing water from the river-one 
joins one's labor to the things so taken. Third, he posits that be-
cause labor is property, others have no right to what the labor is 
"joined to.". Here he is implicitly building upon his earlier ex-
pressed notions of what it means to have "property"-an entitle-
ment not to have what one owns unjustifiably taken away or 
harmed.131 It would harm the laborer to take the apples or water 
from him because doing so would take the labor he had joined to 
these items of sustenance as well. Therefore, one who labors to 
draw forth objects from the common plenitude "has a property" in 
the things so gathered, at least if there is "enough, and as good" 
left for others, because others are under an obligation not to harm 
him by taking the things from him.132 In short, Locke's labor the-
ory may depend upon a "do no harm" rule, and acting upon the 
theory (with no additional justification) is problematic when doing 
so itself causes harm. 
In many contexts, allowing a copyright owner to suppress the 
works he has dispatched into the culture would indeed cause harm. 
The copyright owner has injected something into the common cul-
ture, and its audience may be unable to purge it from their memo-
ries once they have encountered it. Having changed the commu-
nity's culture, the author may actively be committing a harm if he 
then withdraws the work from the community when its new artists 
seek to integrate, assess, and respond to its influence. Perhaps on 
130 See id. I give here my interpretation of Locke's "labor-joining" argument. Locke's 
Second Treatise also contains other arguments regarding, for example, the beneficial results 
of property ownership. 
131 Locke, Second Treatise, ch 2 at 11 6, 8 (cited in note 110); and Karl Olivecrona, The 
Term 'Property' in Locke's Two Treatises of Government, 61 Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozi-
alphilosophie, 109, 113, 114 (1975) (relationship between notions of "property" and the nat-
ural law concept of suum). 
m See Locke, Second Treatise ch 5 at 11 27. The proviso that "enough, and as good" be 
left for others constitutes an additional "do no harm" principle. See also Lawrence C. 
Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). Simi-
larly, Locke's argument regarding waste suggests he saw nothing wrongful in taking prop-
erty from someone to whom it had no value. Locke, Second Treatise ch 5 at 11 37. If so, 
Locke would seem to view a non-harmful taking as non-wrongful, at least in the state of 
nature. 
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balance the first artist's work is still more valuable than not; if so, 
perhaps, some payment is owed to that first artist even when a 
hostile or critical use is made. But even if the restitutionary strain 
in "natural rights" theory will justify complete control and injunc-
tive relief in some circumstances, it will not do so here: neither a.ll 
entitlement to capture the effects one creates, nor Lockean labor 
theory, supports a complete right of exclusion against those whom 
the property negatively affects.133 
What of the "personality" theories? Clearly the artist who 
finds his work attacked will not be happy about it. And yet a re-
gard for emotional attachments or self-actualization does not point 
solely in the direction of suppression and the artist's interests; 
audiences, too, develop attachments to the symbols surrounding 
them, and for audiences, as for artists, use of the symbols may be 
essential to self-expression and to making an impression on the 
world around them.134 
3. Reference to the common law. 
Yet all this is at a fairly high level of generality, and debata-
ble. To what other sources might one look to determine what a 
lawmaker should decide when faced with a claimed right to sup-
press? One possibility is to look to decisionmakers in analogous 
contexts. This leads us to the common law, particularly the area 
known as substantive restitution135 or "unjust enrichment." This is 
the area of the common law most concerned with copyright's cen-
tral issue, the question whether (and when) the law should impose 
noncontractual liability for benefits one person derives from an-
other's efforts. Persons who feel it is illegitimate to be required to 
pay for copying should consider the restitution cases, in which per-
sons who willfully take advantage of benefits made possible by 
others' efforts are sometimes required to pay for them.136 
131 For a fuller development of this theme, see Gordon, Owning the Fruits of Creative 
Labor (draft manuscript, cited in note 107); Gordon, 41 Stan L Rev at 1460-65 (cited in note 
50). 
1
"' See Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 4, 343, 378-81 (Clarendon, 
1988) (arguing that the upshot of the Hegelian analysis is that, in Hegel's own words, " 'ev-
eryone must have property ..• .' "). 
1
•• I here mean to distinguish restitution that itself provides the basis of a cause of 
action from restitution that serves simply as a remedy for the violation of rights provided by 
other doctrines. 
m See Gordon, 41 Stan L Rev at 1454-65 (cited in note 50) (comparing the exceptions 
to the "intermeddler" rule with copyright). 
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The restitution cases are, however, marked by a strong con-
cern with preserving the defendant from an erosion of his auton-
omy,187 and with preserving the defendant from harm. Thus, when 
the choice is between leaving a laborer unrewarded and causing a 
net harm to the defendant, frequently the laborer is left without 
recourse.188 If the common law is any guide, then, authors might 
not be entitled to copyright's rewards in cases where copyright en-
forcement would leave the defendant suffering a net harm. If so, 
authors who attempt to use copyright law to suppress works unfa-
vorable to them should not be completely free to do so.189 Some 
concern for the users' autonomy and safety from harm-some con-
cern with the audience's own moral rights-is necessary. Thus it is 
not just the Lockean proviso that counsels giving some latitude to 
the user who is trying to recast for herself and others harmful sym-
bols and text that have been thrust upon her. 
The common law might offer guidance to some of the other 
questions canvassed above as well. A particularly useful source of 
analogy might be torts, which in many ways functions as the con-
verse of intellectual property.140 As a mirror provides a great deal 
of information through its reversed images, it may be that the 
literature of tort law, the civil branch of the law of harms, could 
contain significant wisdom applicable to the jurisprudence of 
benefits. 
m See George E. Palmer, 2 The Law of Restitution 359 (Little, Brown 1978) ("long-
standing judicial reluctance to encourage one person to intervene in the affairs of another by 
rewarding restitution of benefits thereby conferred."). 
118 See Levmore, 71 Va L Rev at 77-78, 84 (cited in note 128) (law denies restitution 
where a nonbargained "benefit" may not in fact make recipient better off; even at a "less-
than-market" price the unsolicited benefit "may be undesirable to a wealth-constrained" 
recipient); see generally Gordon, Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse 
(draft manuscript, cited in note 41). 
m The desirability of avoiding harm expresses itself as a legal principle with weight in 
many other areas of the common law as well. See Gordon, 41 Stan L Rev at 1362-65; 1461-63 
(cited in note 50) (under common law systems property owners generally not privileged to 
do harm). 
"
0 A caveat regarding nomenclature is in order here. When property rights are violated, 
the resulting cause of action is typically classified as a tort. Copyright is no exception; copy-
right infringement is classified as a tort. See William F. Patry, Latman's The Copyright 
Law at 266 (cited in note 19). It would therefore be circular to refer to "tort law" as a source 
of insight for copyright if one meant only the branch of torts that effectuates owners' rights 
to exclude. But of course tort law does more than protect a property owner's right to ex-
clude. It also mediates non-property relations, as in the law of negligence, and, through the 
law of nuisance, it helps define the hazier boundaries of a property owner's entitlements. In 
these latter areas tort cases tend to serve as a locus for substantive policy discussion about 
what rights should be granted. It is to this discussion and consequent experimentation that 
I refer when !'suggest looking to "tort law" for informative analogies to some of our intellec-
tual property questions. 
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First, both copyright and torts can be interpreted as serving 
non-instrumental ends. Whether in terms of morality, fairness, or 
"corrective justice," one can argue that an innocent victim injured 
by a harm-causer "deserves" to be made whole and that the de-
fendant "ought" to pay. Similarly, it is often argued that a creative 
person "deserves" to be paid for what he has brought to the world, 
and that the user of another's work "ought" to give recompense for 
it. The question of what role should be played by a creator's claim 
to "fair return" is largely unresolved in copyright.141 It is likely 
that there is some grain of truth in that much-invoked but little-
analyzed notion, "the natural rights of an author," and only sys-
tematic analysis can separate that grain from the rhetoric of per-
petual and all-encompassing claims that now clings to it. Perhaps 
the literature exploring notions of "desert" and "corrective justice" 
in torts, and in criminal law as well, could be of assistance here. 
Second, and perhaps more important, both copyright and torts 
serve a particular incentive function: they seek to "internalize ex-
ternalities." That is, both copyright and torts seek to bring deci-
sions' effects to bear on persons with power to affect how things 
are done. In copyright, the primary person to be affected is the 
creator; he is ordinarily the "best benefit generator" and is to be 
encouraged to produce by being given a right to capture a portion 
of the benefits he creates.142 In torts, the primary person to be af-
fected is the tortfeasor; he is ordinarily the "cheapest cost avoider" 
and is discouraged from taking unnecessary risks with others' per-
sons and possessions by the specter of a suit imposing liability for 
any harm caused. Thus, both doctrines aim at providing incen-
tives.143 Conceivably the lessons of one could be useful for the 
other. 
We might try, for example, viewing the creative user problem 
from the perspective of the tort doctrines that recognize that the 
person best able to effectuate desirable action is not always the 
person in the defendant's position. For example, if a pedestrian is 
"contributorily" or "comparatively" negligent by running in front 
of a car, that behavior will eliminate or reduce any recovery that 
141 See, for example, Vol I at 4-9; Vol II at 685-86. See also Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev 1659 
(cited in note 115). 
"' Persons with the potential to create valuable works have rights over the use others 
make of their products; the benefits the authors create are brought home via license or 
royalty fees, and productive behavior is encouraged. 
1° Copyright provides positive incentives to persons with control over potentially crea-
tive resources, and the law of torts provides negative incentives to persons with control over 
resources with destructive potential. 
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might be sought. The economic logic is familiar: when the pedes-
trian is better positioned than the driver to avoid an accident,1"" it 
is the pedestrian's behavior the law should seek to change; one way 
to change that behavior is to force pedestrians to bear some of 
their own costs if they choose to behave carelessly. The formal les-
son of the logic is also familiar: in every transaction there are two 
parties, and deciding how to "internalize" costs between them is a 
choice that should depend on context rather on formal classifica-
tions such as plaintiff or defendant.146 If all the harms that would 
not occur "but for" the defendant's driving were internalized to 
that driver, others who might become involved might have an in-
adequate incentive to be careful. 
The same lesson could be applied, just as simply, to copyright. 
If all the benefits that could be traced to a first artist through a 
"but for" test were internalized to her, no one else would have a 
monetary incentive to build upon her work. If a creative copyist is 
in a better position to contribute to the culture than is the first 
artist, then perhaps the law should take care to direct positive in-
centives to such persons by, for example, giving them a copyright 
in their derivative works. It may be that tort tests of responsibility 
would remind us that "incentive" works both ways, and might 
even assist us in parsing where an "infringing derivative work" 
ends and a non-infringing work begins. 
Copyright is less a field of law than a domain: while the bulk 
of American law regulates the behavior of persons in regard to tan-
gible things and each other, copyright regulates the behavior of 
persons in regard to a particular species of intangible, the "work of 
authorship." Copyright, like the rest of American jurisprudence, 
has a law of property (Vol I at chapters 2-5), a law of tort (Vol I at 
chapter 6 and Vol II at chapters 7-10), a law of contract (Vol I at 
405-36 and 480-511), a law of procedure and remedies (Vol II at 
chapters 11-14), a law of inheritance (Vol I at 450-57, 485-93), and 
even its own branches of criminal law (Vol II at 289-306) and in-
ternational law (Vol II at chapter 16). It is only fitting that copy-
right can learn from what the rest of the law has to teach. 
14
• See generally Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis 134-40 (Yale, 1970) ("cheapest cost avoider"). 
10 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960). 

